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I. Introduction 
Daniel Martin has, in his Note Dispersing the Cloud,1 seized 
on an important and symbolic stick from the traditional property 
bundle. By showing the vicissitudes the right to destroy has 
suffered in the transition from Roman to common to modern law,2 
Martin offers us a useful roadmap for the slowly shifting powers 
we take for granted over what is ours and demonstrates a way 
forward for one of the oldest of them.  
Consumers should have a right to digital destruction for a 
range of reasons. First, it is a good idea because the power to 
destroy is highly symbolic. We have long given up Blackstone’s 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. 
 1. Daniel Martin, Note, Dispersing the Cloud: Reaffirming the Right to 
Destroy in a New Era of Digital Property, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2017). 
 2. See id. at 8–19 (tracing the history of the right to destroy). 
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“sole and despotic dominion,”3 but it is useful to be reminded of 
the important sense behind that ringing call to battle: that the 
owner should be permitted to do what she likes with what is hers, 
insofar as the legal regime can tolerate it. That message is an 
important one now, when we do not control—and therefore do not 
own in any recognizable meaning of the term—our smartphones, 
smart television sets, smart homes, or smart cars.4  
Second, there is also a deeply practical element to Martin’s 
theory. His argument that digital intangibles can be destroyed is, 
alone, important.5 The received wisdom is that destruction of 
digital intangibles is simply too hard, given the nature of 
information technology and the characteristics of information 
itself. I will try to show in this brief comment that the naysayers 
have been too quick off the mark. There are certainly difficulties 
in securing destruction of information-based property, largely 
because the transaction costs of copying are so low that computer 
systems make large numbers of copies purely to function. But the 
very same systems that are making rivalrous6 digital property 
possible make an owner’s real power of permanent destruction 
feasible.  
II. Theorizing Destruction 
A. Destruction as Guarantor of Property Rules 
One core contribution Martin makes to the theory of 
destruction is to draw attention toward alternative motives for 
exercising the right to destroy. Courts are skeptical of destruction 
                                                                                                     
 3. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 4. See JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE NEW 
DIGITAL SERFDOM (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author) 
(“We own and control fewer and fewer of the products that we must use to 
function in modern society.”). 
 5. See Martin, supra note 1, at 52–55 (addressing the “the question [of] 
whether cloud-maintained digital property is even capable of deletion”). 
 6. “Rivalry is the inherent characteristic of traditional property that limits 
control of the property, at any given time, to one person . . . . Intangible 
rivalrous property, such as an email address, is an example of virtual property. 
By appropriating an email address for personal use, the user excludes others 
from using it.” Charles Blazer, The Five Indicia of Virtual Property, 5 PIERCE L. 
REV. 137, 143 (2006). 
APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION 541 
of scarce resources for spite’s sake.7 Perhaps, Martin theorizes, 
courts might be more open to the destruction of non-scarce (but 
still rivalrous) resources for the purpose of securing the owner’s 
peace of mind.8 The question is whether there are other 
motivations for destruction that might resonate with courts that 
fall closer to Martin’s peace of mind theory on the spectrum than 
to the spiteful destruction of scarce resources. 
The game theoretic thrust of destruction is that it 
disincentivizes attempts to seize the asset against the will of the 
owner through some form of liability rule9 or outright theft. 
Consider the archetypal game of chicken: “Two hooligans with 
something to prove drive at each other on a narrow road. The 
first to swerve loses faces among his peers. If neither swerves, 
however, a terminal fate plagues both.”10 One of the key moves is 
to rip out the steering wheel—that is, to ensure that if the other 
party continues on its path, there will be a crash. Technology can 
serve as the precommitment strategy—the steering wheel 
remover. This is the standard arrangement on an iPhone: if a 
potential intruder continues on their course of action of guessing 
wrong passwords, the phone will automatically delete the 
encryption key, rendering the data inaccessible.11 This strongly 
                                                                                                     
 7. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1975) (finding that “senseless destruction serving no apparent good 
purpose is to be held in disfavor”). 
 8. See Martin, supra note 1, at 35 (arguing that “peace of mind, certainty, 
security—however one wishes to phrase it—is a fundamental aspect of property 
law”). 
 9. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1092 (1972) (“Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is 
willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected 
by a liability rule.”). 
 10. Mikhael Shor, Game of Chicken, GAME THEORY.NET, 
http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/Games/GameofChicken.html (last 
updated Sept. 1, 2006) (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 11. See Alina Selyukh & Camila Domonoske, Apple, The FBI and iPhone 
Encryption: A Look at What’s at Stake, NPR (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/17/467096705/apple-the-fbi-
and-iphone-encryption-a-look-at-whats-at-stake (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) 
(describing the iPhone’s encryption system) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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disincentivizes theft, as the technological encryption key wipes 
out valuable data, denying the thief a large part of her gains. 
In this sense, then, the power to destroy serves not just to 
give the user peace of mind that data contained within a 
destructible digital asset is gone forever, but a more robust peace 
of mind: the idea that the asset will be destroyed rather than 
involuntarily transferred, accessed, or used. It strikes me, 
therefore, that destruction serves as a particularly effective 
guarantor of property rules against liability rule attempts to seize 
the asset. Consider the destruction of assets after death. Perhaps 
the testator believes that the person who is attempting to acquire 
the property is simply waiting for the testator’s death instead of 
negotiating for the acquisition of the asset. A will with a 
destruction clause in this context is not born from spite, but social 
technology, an analog version of the iPhone’s digital “dead man’s 
switch.” The effect of either is that it is much harder to 
circumvent negotiating with the owner to access the asset by 
waiting for her to die (in the case of a will) or trying to hack the 
phone while out of the owner’s possession (in the iPhone’s case). 
The relevant peace of mind is therefore peace from harassment 
and intrusion for existing assets, as well as the peace that flows 
from the permanent destruction of past assets. Of course, this 
does not deal with the court’s opposition to the waste of 
destroying scarce assets, but as the next section discusses, the 
assets Martin discusses are often rivalrous, but not scarce. 
B. Threading the Needle  
Martin’s theory neatly threads the needle between scarcity 
and rivalrousness. American courts have consistently disfavored 
the right to destroy scarce resources, on grounds of waste.12 If the 
resources Martin references were truly scarce, then there is every 
chance that courts would remain hostile to a right to destroy.  
Digital resources, however, are often not scarce. For example, 
it takes only a click of a mouse to generate a million extra copies 
of the latest pop hit. This raises the other problem, though: 
intellectual property issues aside, how can anything so easily 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Martin, supra note 1, at 13–15 (discussing cases in which courts 
limit the right to destroy on the basis of waste). 
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copyable be destroyed? Both computers as end nodes and 
computers as connecting nodes of an informational network 
operate solely on the basis of copying. Both technology and 
economics drive the massive redundancy of digital resources. 
Computers convey information by copying, retain copies to verify 
transmission, backup copies to insure against failure, and, most 
importantly in the data economy, gather and sell enormous and 
evolving user datasets as the primary method for monetizing 
internet services.  
To thread the needle, it is useful to note that there are 
emerging classes of rivalrous, non-scarce assets. This is most 
clearly seen in the license server model. Consider 1,000 copies of 
a digital asset, whether a game, an MP3, or a unit of a digital 
currency. One centralized server can keep a list of who owns 
what, and if we use the Bitcoin blockchain protocol—which we’ll 
talk about below—we don’t even need a centralized server. If my 
specific digital copy is copy #547, then it does not matter whether 
it can be duplicated. That copy #547 is linked to a database in the 
server, and if that particular copy is duplicated, then the server 
will know that the second linked copy is illegitimate. Similarly, 
the mechanisms of rivalrousness provide the means of effective 
destruction. If the license server terminates the entry, then copy 
#547 is no longer a legitimate copy. That is not total destruction, 
but combined with encryption and the storage of some resources 
on the server (so that the client asset, once de-linked, is useless), 
we can use the emerging technology of digital rivalrousness to 
effect digital destruction.  
Bitcoins are a prime example of this sort of technology. 
Bitcoins, of course, are intangible, mere entries in a decentralized 
database called the blockchain.13 Because these entries on the 
blockchain are secured by encryption, then only a person with a 
specific encryption key can access or transfer a Bitcoin.14 If that 
encryption key is lost or deleted, the Bitcoin is permanently lost. 
This is called “burning” in the Bitcoin community,15 and made for 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, BitProperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 814 
(2015) (describing Bitcoins and the blockchain technology). 
 14. See id. at 820 (“Each person within the property system has a pair of 
cryptographically related keys, one public, given to everyone in the world to use, 
and one private, held only by the individual.”). 
 15. See Antoine Le Calvez, How to Destroy Bitcoins, MEDIUM (Nov. 16, 
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some of the most compelling early stories. One Bitcoin user threw 
out the hard drive on which his Bitcoins (or, more accurately, the 
encryption keys that validated his ability to transfer them) were 
stored, and the hard drive went to the landfill.16 He lost $7.5 
million worth of Bitcoin as surely as if he had converted them to 
cash and burned it.17  
Another example comes from the virtual community Eve 
Online, a massively multiplayer online science fiction game 
where players can exchange real dollars for virtual objects (and 
vice versa) and engage in virtual battles that therefore cost real 
money in terms of virtual objects destroyed. One battle saw the 
destruction of over $200,000 worth of virtual spaceships and 
equipment.18 All questions about why players value video game 
objects at thousands of dollars aside, the mechanisms of 
rivalrousness enabled the destruction of those ships. The game 
provider keeps track of which assets are connected to which 
accounts. When a ship is destroyed, the data entry is changed, 
and the player no longer has that ship within the game.  
For intellectual property, the problem is the nature of 
intellectual property itself. Judge Posner noted that the 
difference between personal and intellectual property is the 
marginal cost of creation.19 For personal or real property, the 
marginal cost of creation does not go down. Manufacturing the 
nth computer costs about as much as manufacturing the n+1st. 
But making the first recording of a new song has a vastly 
                                                                                                     
2015), https://medium.com/@alcio/how-to-destroy-Bitcoins-255bb6f2142e#.erj44 
cdsd (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Burning Bitcoins is making them 
unspendable.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. Alexander Smith, IT Worker Throws Out Hard Drive, Loses $7.5 
Million Bitcoin Fortune, NBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2013, 7:57 AM), 
www.nbcnews.com/news/other/it-worker-throws-out-hard-drive-loses-7-5-
million-f2D11669738 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Rich McCormick, Spaceships Worth More Than $200,000 Destroyed in 
Biggest Virtual Space Battle Ever, VERGE (Jan. 29, 2014), 
www.theverge.com/2014/1/29/5356498/eve-online-battle-sees-200000-dollars-
worth-of-spaceships-destroyed (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics 
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 57, 62–64 (2005) (discussing the 
transaction costs of intellectual property). 
APPETITE FOR DESTRUCTION 545 
different cost than copy-pasting the MP3 once it has been 
recorded. Of course, manufacturing brings economies of scale, 
and 3D printing perhaps brings lower marginal costs to physical 
duplicates without such economies, but the marginal cost of 
duplicating intellectual property is so close to zero that even the 
lowest marginal costs of producing personal property cannot come 
close.  
Martin does not differentiate between the categories of 
emerging rivalrous intangible property and non-rivalrous 
intellectual property. His cloud examples contain elements of 
each, with an additional element of personal interest.20 At several 
points he makes his strongest argument, which is that at least 
digital property originating from the self should be subject to the 
right to destroy.21 That’s clever, and provides a potential bridge 
between European jurisprudence, where a right to delete is taken 
seriously, and American jurisprudence, where property intuitions 
are stronger than privacy intuitions.  
So, to what shall we apply this right to destroy? If it is to 
smart property, the ability to destroy proceeds from the 
physicality of the linked hardware. If to intangible personal 
property—not intellectual property—then we must distinguish 
between intangible property that is rivalrous and intangible 
property that isn’t. That difference is important because we will 
be able to use the systems set up to make a digital thing unique 
to be able to destroy it. Non-rivalrous digital property comes close 
to intellectual property, where we have our greatest difficulties. 
Here the problem is the raw multiplicity of copies that propagate 
throughout a system. That, combined with the fact that most 
information technology systems are almost fiendishly designed to 
retain duplicates of information, means that the right to destroy 
could turn into a game of whack-a-mole.  
Martin references “the cloud,” but just as quickly notes that 
nobody knows what that is.22 In the case of digital property, the 
cloud includes two models that have quite different impacts on 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Martin, supra note 1, at 19–29 (discussing digital property 
managed via cloud storage services). 
 21. See id. at 5–7 (discussing the hypothetical example of a photographer 
attempting to delete her digital, cloud-maintained photo file). 
 22. See id. at 24 (“What is the cloud? Even among industry experts, the 
answer to that question is up in the air.”). 
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the theory he proposes. The first is that the cloud might operate 
on a license server model. This is an attempt to make the digital 
assets unique by linking them to a register. The second is that 
the cloud might operate on a backup model. Here, the goal is to 
enable the computer to recover from nearly any failure by saving 
and backing up the data as much as possible. Of course, the two 
can work together, with redundancy serving as the backup to the 
license server information. But in a legal sense, the two operate 
quite differently: the license server model lends itself to personal 
property descriptions. The redundancy model more closely tracks 
discussions of intellectual property. 
Are the differentiations useful? Should we describe a new 
property form (pace Henry Smith and Tom Merrill’s Numerus 
Clausus)23 that somehow captures the emerging consensus 
around intangible personal property? Or are the concerns about 
control and finality that Martin describes universal to both 
intellectual and intangible personal property? 
I believe that there is value in distinguishing between 
intellectual property and intangible personal property, largely 
because my personal academic project is the recognition of 
consumer interests in the software, digital assets, and virtual 
objects that they purchase. The value in continuing to conflate 
intellectual and intangible personal property is that it would 
permit users who have some sort of origination right to their data 
to exercise intellectual property controls, including the right to 
deny use of that data to anyone else.  
C. Privacy, Property, and Origination 
This, then, is the core of Martin’s argument, as applied to 
data that originates in an individual. Traditional property rights 
give a right to destroy. People wish that certain data about them 
could be destroyed. Some of that data is held in digital objects, 
like Google Docs, that are the spiritual successors to papers that 
would have traditionally been deemed personal property. 
American courts have been liberal in granting citizens property 
remedies, including the very easy remedy of not doing anything 
                                                                                                     
 23. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the 
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
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to disturb the owner’s decision to delete or destroy. Martin’s 
example of the “Will it Blend?” video series is instructive.24 No 
matter how troubled the right to destroy may be in terms of a 
testator’s right to burn down her house after her death, it is quite 
improbable that destruction of an iPhone would generate any 
form of legal liability.  
There is no question that a right of ultimate disposition—a 
right to destroy—would help with the project of protecting 
personal data. The difficulty is that it involves odd contours in 
the law of property. We have never propertized data. Facts are 
neither owned as a matter of intellectual property, nor considered 
personal property. The confusion stems from the fact that some 
data used to be contained within personal property, and the 
destruction of the personal property entailed the destruction of 
the data.  
III. Operationalizing Destruction 
It is my contention that the difference between raw unowned 
factual data, intellectual property, and rivalrous intangible 
personal property has significant explanatory power over our 
ability to actually destroy cloud-stored intangibles. Intellectual 
property, like other forms of data, can only be destroyed if 
encrypted. Intangible personal property (which, somewhat 
confusingly, can include specific copies of copyrighted material) 
has the additional advantage of being able to leverage the 
mechanisms of rivalrousness to functionally destroy the digital 
artifact. 
A. Encryption 
Even if data itself is not property, the digital boxes that 
contain it might be. And those boxes can be destroyed. Consider, 
for example, best practices for data stored with a cloud provider, 
like DropBox, that may release the information to parties without 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Martin, supra note 1, at 2–3 (discussing an advertising series that 
literally blends “unconventional items, from toy cars to cans of soup” to, in one 
feature, an iPhone). 
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the data originator’s consent (in the case of DropBox, most 
commonly in response to a warrant or administrative 
subpoena).25 Users can create encrypted volumes with the cloud 
provider, making it impossible for the cloud provider to disclose 
the data. Insofar as the data remains within the encrypted 
volume, it is subject to destruction. Just as the owner of a Bitcoin 
can delete the encryption key that permits her to access or 
transfer Bitcoins, so the owner of an encrypted volume can delete 
the encryption, irreversibly wiping the contents.  
Recall the incident in which the FBI wished to enter one of 
the San Bernadino shooters’ iPhones.26 The data within the 
phone was encrypted, and Apple did not have the encryption 
key.27 The FBI attempted to pressure Apple into using its 
software distribution network to accept malware as an 
over-the-air update, which would disable the encryption 
function.28 The point here is that the FBI needed a back door 
because it could not get through the walls. The risk in that case 
was that after a limited number of password guesses, the phone 
would erase itself, or, more precisely, erase the encryption key 
used to access the phone’s contents.29 Without that tiny bit of 
information, no known technology can recover the data. 
That is destruction of data, complete and irreversible. Of 
course, the data has to be within an encrypted container, but that 
is not difficult to manage. In a way, the encrypted container 
method of destruction works particularly well for the cloud 
services model. It permits the data to be remotely accessed and 
stored, and even to be backed up (in encrypted form) by the cloud 
services provider. Once the key is gone, however, the encrypted 
data is inaccessible for good, no matter where stored or how many 
times it has been backed up or copied.  
                                                                                                     
 25. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 67 (2015) (describing how law 
enforcement agencies such as the FBI obtain information from third parties 
such as Dropbox). 
 26. See Selyukh & Domonoske, supra note 11 (discussing the incident). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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B. Leveraging Rivalrousness 
The second component of operationalizing a right to destroy 
will be to use the systems of rivalrousness that currently govern 
intangible property. This method will of course only work for 
those systems for which managed rivalrousness matters. The 
example of an MP3 is instructive. An MP3 may be tracked by a 
license server, and if it is, then destruction of the link between 
the MP3 and the license server will have an effect. Consider one 
older DRM model under which some songs were not playable 
unless the license server indicated that the user’s copy checked 
out. (Nothing in this Comment promotes such DRM license-
server models. I merely note that it is possible to use DRM 
license-server models to operationalize destruction.) If the value 
of the asset is that it remains linked to the central list of who 
owns what, then the value of the digital asset can be destroyed by 
de-linking it from the central list. Another example is a valuable 
digital asset in a video game. The value of the asset is that it can 
be used in a shared environment. If I have an awesome hat in 
Team Fortress 2, others can see it and admire my sartorial skills 
and presumed gaming prowess. The point is that the value of the 
item is not in the pixel but in the network and social context in 
which the item appears. It does me no good to have a piece of 
valuable virtual personal property if there is no one to admire it.  
Since the game creator’s central server, or the MP3 licensor’s 
license server, dictates who has a legitimate copy of the asset, it 
is possible to destroy assets by destroying the legitimacy of the 
link. This is how a game company can destroy a valuable weapon 
in a game, even though the resource, the code for the sword, still 
resides on the user’s computer. And nobody cares how many 
times the pixels are drawn, erased, and redrawn. Those are not 
the essence of the digital property. The essence of the digital 
property lies in the legitimacy of its appearance within the game. 
By de-linking the asset, it no longer appears in a game 
character’s inventory. By de-linking a downloaded game, it is no 
longer available in a buyer’s Steam library. By de-linking a book, 
it is no longer available in the user’s Kindle collection. By 
de-linking an iTunes song, it is no longer available in the iTunes 
library. And so on. 
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The key here is that the legitimacy of the asset is 
destructible. With legitimacy comes convenience. It very 
convenient to download an asset once one has legally purchased 
it. Illegally obtaining and accessing software, music, or even 
hacked versions of networked assets like equipment within a 
game is costlier in terms of time and effort. Note that I do not 
claim it is impossible to obtain illegitimate copies, or even 
particularly difficult. But small transaction costs have large 
effects on low-value, high-volume transactions. Buying a Kindle 
is simply easier than trying to download a million ebooks from 
the Pirate Bay. 
IV. Conclusion 
Martin’s take on destruction divorces the debate from the 
American-frontier focus on preserving scarce resources against 
waste. It also creates a fascinating space between rivalrousness 
and scarcity, in which courts may be willing to enforce a right to 
destroy where there is no waste, and those rights are practically 
enforceable because the technological systems that undergird 
digital rivalrousness. For instance, destroying the data on an 
iPhone or a blockchain entry might be supported by courts 
because it is not waste, and is enforceable as a practical matter 
because of container encryption and distributed ledger 
technology. 
The practical effects of a strengthened theory of destruction 
also lead to a deepening of Martin’s theory of peace of mind. 
Peace of mind in the more constrained sense relates to being sure 
that data, once deleted, is gone. That’s a hard row to hoe, given 
the redundancy of information processing systems. A deeper 
peace of mind might relate less to the final and total deletion of 
information and more to the incentives potential expropriators 
might have to circumvent negotiation with the owner.  
